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Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm*

Nancy B. Rapoporte*

[Former Enron CEO Jeffrey] Slcillingoffered a hypothesis for what brought
Enron down, calling it a "perfect storm" of events.
H e speculated &at questions raised about the quality ofEnron's accounting and about self-dealing caused a loss of confidence in the financial community. That led to Enron's debt being downgraded.
That downgrade, he said he was told by an Enron executive after he left,
meant Enron couldn't access several billion dollars of baclc-up credit lines.
A liquidity crunch followed, he said, even though Enron was solvent and
highly profitable.
-Laura

Goldberg, Horrstoiz CIIroizi~l~'

* Originally published at 71 F O ~ H A L.
M REV. 1373 (2003). Reprinted with permission.
** Dean and Professor of Law at the Universiry of Houston Law Center. All views expressed in this
essay are mine alone, and not those of the University of Houston or in faculty, st&, or administmuon. I
want t o th:~nliEnlily Chnn-Ngu).cn, I<elli C.inc. Luddiu Collins. B;Jn D.~;~ran.
I'arrick 1:lanxg~n.Jimmy
t l ~ l ~ ~ r Sr ui sn .n Hlntnnn, hlichclc Hcdccr.
" Xlorris & Shir1c.i. lhoooorr. Harricr I<ichm.ln,1utTV.m Nir.1.
and Michelle WE. I also want to thank the students in my 2002 Seminar on Spcciallrrrrer br Ethicr; Sara
Alonro Oliver, Justin Berg, Alison Chicn, Doug Du Bois, Trevor Fish, PatriclcFlanagan (who gcn thanked
twice, because he was also one of the cite-checlcers Tor this article), IGm Havel, Cathy Helenhouse, Colin
Moore, Sandy Oballe, Kevin Powers. Barry Rienrm, Ron Smeberg, and T i k n y Toups.
Laura Goldberg, Did No IVmrix, SkilIi~rxSays: DEfCnd( HiT Role in Enron Fall HOUS. CI-IllON., Jan.
17, 2002, nvailnble at http:/l www.chron.com/u;lCDNst0ry.hn/sp~~ia1/nmn/dc0l/l183520;
rer nlro
GoodlclorningAnzericnia (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 7, 2002) (Wl eyer will be on former CEO Jeff
Slulling. Skilling blames Enron's collapse on an unfortunate collision of events-the perfect storm. Congressional investigators point our he wa;t at Enron's helm at rhc rime."). Of course, now cveryoncand I
mean everyone-has latched onto this ''perfect storm" metaphor. See, e.g., Fedrrd Documenc Clearing
House, Worldcorn CEO John Sidgmore Testifies Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Tmsportarion, July 30, 2002, auaihble at 2002 WL 1753183, at '3 (statement of John
Sidgmore, CEO, WorldCom) ("Scverd factors. . . convrrged ro create, I'll usc Mr. Legcrc's words, a ldnd

.
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Of course, we now lmow the e x t ~ a o r d i ncombination
~
of circumstances
that existed at that time which you would not meet again in 100 years; thac
h e y should all have existed just on thac particular night shows, of course,
that everytbing was against us.
-Second

OfEcer Charles Lightoller, RkfS Titalzi2

I had some misgivings about calling [my boolc] The Pe?@ct Storm, but in
the end I decided that the intent was sufficiently clear. I use perfect in the
meteorological sense: a storm that could not possibly have been worse.

Much has been written about the Enron fiasco, from scholarly article2 to popular
b o o l ~ sand
, ~ I'm sure dlat much more will be written about the deals that brought the

of perfect storm-and 1 guamntee you we did not rehearse this-that ripped through thc rclecommunications indurrry."); Fedcrd Document Clearing House, Hnrtnin~gPntietrt Acce~sto &re: The Ovpact of
Evce~iiveLitigatioa,July 17,2002, nvnilnblent2002WL 1584492, ar '3 (statement ofRichard Anderson,
CEO, The Doctori Company) ("The combination OF these facrars created . . . the perfect storm . . . far
mcdicd linlri.ity inrurcrr."); Federal Docurnr.nr Clc;iring Housr.. Hor~rrCu,,,u,itret. u,, E<b,rirlion.,ad il,r
I ~ ~ v ~ Hol,/~
~ / ~.z Hc..zr;>,v
r c ~ ~ ou Ejtroui Lle,~/it~
l'l,,~i, 1 ~ , 1it, COJ>!D/~,J,~L.<
IY'irI, L , I ( ~ 0. I , E~ t' ~,~ ~ ~ l o ~ ~ t r - S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /
Pertrioe Plmrr, Feb. 7, 2002, nvitiln6le le~t2002 WL 203240, at '12 (staremenr of Teresa Ghilarducci,
Associare Profaror of Economics, Univcrsiry of Norrc Damc) ("The 1990s was rhc perfect storm for
pensions to increase."); Federal Document Clearing House, US. Smtrjrrdicinry Cornnrinee H o l d Henr; ~ ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ t n 6 i l i g ~ ~ ~ eFcb.
~ :6,2002,
L ~ ~ ~nvni[nblent2002
~ ~ L ~ m e dWL
F r188865,
ont~~~r~i~n~,
ar '1 1-12 (snrcmcnr ofChristine Gregoirr, Anorney Gcnenl, Wahingran Stare) ("In Washington [Scare,]
wc fccl lilic Enron has bccn rhc garhrring of the pcrfecr srorm. Firsr, they gouged our cansumen and rate
pnyers with highly questionable power prices last year. And now, sadly, they have defrauded our investors
and others across rhc nation.").
Onc afthe coolesr things that can happen to a law professor happened to me after I first published this
nrricle in the Fordham Lntu Reuirru. I sent a copy ro Sebmtian Junger, author OFTHE
PERFE(JTSTORM. He
read it m d said that I was correct in my undcrstznding of the "perfect storm" concept. Thank you, Mr.
Jungcr!
WALTERLORO,THENIGHTLNG ON 47 (1987) [hereinafter THENIGHTLIVES ON].

-

.

'

SEIlASTKN]UNGER, Tl-IE PERFECT ST0Rh.L:ATRUESTORY OF MEN AGAINST THE S U x i v (1997).
"ee, t.g.. Michelle Chm-Fishel. AjerE>rron: HoroAccorratit~gn,~dSECR./.n~z
Cnn Prornote Corporntr
ilccorn~mbiligIVhilr Re~tori~zgPrtblic
Co,~jidnrce,32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10965 (2002); Xmothy P. Duane,
Rcptlntio~iXlitionnle;Lenn~i~~gfiorn
the Cfllt$n~inEtrer~,Criris, 1 9 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002); Marisa
Rogaway, Recnrt Dcue1opnrerr1r.s Proposed Refinns to the Regitlntiorr of40lfk) PLnu ill the Wake of the Enrorr
Dirmter, 6 J. SMALL 8LEMEllGlNG BUS. L. 423 (2002); Marissa P. Vicaro, Can Reptlntion FnirDirdmrrre
Sttruive theilftmrmth nfE~tron?,40 DUQ. L. REV. 695 (2002).
See, e.g. DIN< 1. BARWVELD, TklE ENRON COLLAPSe: C U T I V E ACCOUNTING, WRONG ECONOMICS 011 CIUMINALACTS? A LOOK INTO THE ROOT CAUSE OFTHE LARGE BANICRUI'TCY IN U.S.
HlSrORY (2002); ROBERTBRYCE, PIPE DWMS: GREED,EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON (2002);
LORENFOX, ENRON:THE RISE A N 0 FALL (2002); PETER C. FUSARO 81 ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT
WRONG.AT ENRON: EVERYONE'S GUIDETO THE LARGE BANl(RU1'TCY IN U.S. HISTORY (2002).

company down, the arrogance of some of the main players, and the ethical and moral
issues thar seemed to come to light only after the story brolte in the media.%nron's
collapse, along with the failures of such other mega-businesses as WorldCom and Glo~,~
new legislationu and introduced such heretofore arcane acrobal C r o ~ s i n triggered
nyms as "SPEs" into the general lexicon.' The metaphor most used to describe Enron's
quiclt descent into chapter 11 has been the "perfect storm."
That "perfect storm" metaphor irlcs me no end. I maintain, and this essay is designed to illustrate, thar what brought Enron down-at least as far as we lcnowwasn't a once-in-a-lifetime alignment of elements beyond its control. Rather, Enron's

%nc of the reasons thar I'm sure more will be written is that I'm worldng an such a project: ENRON:
COWORATE FIASCOSSL THEIRIMPLICATIONS (with Bda G. Dharan).
'Take a look at the largest bankruptcies, in terms of approximate stated liabilities, in d ~ past
e twelve
months [2001-021: WatldCom (7102 banltruprcy filing) ($43 billion, including $2 billion more in liabilities discovered afrer the banliruptcy filing); Enran (12101) ($32 billion); NTL, Inc. (5102) ($23.4
billion); Adelphia (6102) ($18.6 billion); Global Crossing (1102) ($12.4 billion); lllvlart (1102) ($10.2
billion). See Amctican Banlrruprcy Insrirute, A Lonklrzride theh.Igt~-Cme,10th Annual Southwctt Banliruprcy Conference, Sepr. 12-15, 2002; Bill Atldnson, Kntnrt File, Chapter 11 Bnrrknrptry: No. 3 Diicourzter Cites Ifink Eoaon?): Tough Co,,rpttitioa: 'Could,riPay the Bilk) Stift hlovr Swpri~t~;
$2 Billion
Loa~rto AidFinni. Reorgn~timtion,BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 2002, i r 1A ("Thc Troy, Mi&.-bascd firm listed
$17 billion in assets and $1 1.3 billion in liabilities. . . . [Allrhough Kmart's banliruptcy is large, it pdus in
comparison to the largest bnnlcmprcy in history, filed last m o n d ~by Enron Corp . . . [which] listed $49
billion in assets and $31.2 billion in debts."); Julie Crewell. GoirrgFor Broke; Crml~!Thcre Goer Another
Cotnpflnyiito Bankniptry. Hozu Did I#
Get H m ? (Long Stoqt) Are 1% O ~ tht
I
hI~nd?(Dm> Bet on It,),
FORTUNE, Feb. 18,2002, nunilnble at 2002 WL 2190302; Lorrie Grant, Dimrrnter Hope~firFmt Reorgnrrizntiou, USATOOAY,Jan. 23, 2002, at B02 ("Kmarr listcd $16.28 billion in z5sets and $10.34 billion
in debts."); Andrav Lcclrcy, Bnakrnptcier L e n ~ ~ e l r ~ u ~ thc-LztrCjl,
s f o n i ~ ~ CHI.TNB.,Aug. 27, 2002, nr,nildble
at2002 WL 2689322; Alexandra R Moscs, Chern Yell I(wok, &Thomar; Lce ct d., RetnilrrK~~~nrtFiIr~
fir Bnrrknptcy: 0A;ciah Plan to Close Some Sto~rs,Reorpnize, ST. Louls POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 23,2002.
acAl ("[IGnarrl has 510.25 billion in debt."); Chris Reidy, Ifimrt Z ~ ~ ~ ~ b l r ~ D i r o e r r t R e t inRecord
~~ilCl~ni~~
C h p . 11 FiIii~g,BOSTON GLOBE. Jan. 23. 2002, ur C1 ("In its bankruptcy filing, I h a n and its US
subsidiaries listed $17 billion in total assets at baolivdue and r o d liabilities of $1 1.3 billion as of the
quarter ended Oct. 31."); Gary Young, Mnjor BnnknptcieiFiI~di7z N ~ I15rk
U Citjt, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (Aug.
1, 2002).
See, e.8.. Sarbnnes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Snr. 745, Corporate 2nd Criminal
Fmud Accountabiliry Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Scar. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 4 1348,
1514A, 1519-20) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxleyl; Fra~rreiuorkfir6 r h 1 1 c i ~the
~ gQz~lliqoffi~mrrcinllr,f.rr~zntiorrThrot~gl~
hr~provrnzcritof Ouerright ofthe Anditi>zgProce~~,
67 Fed. Reg. 44964-01 (proposed July 5,
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 210.229).

'

If you don't believe me, j u t do a search in WESTLAW or L W S on "SPW and see how many
documents you get, ctpecidly documcnts dared after October 2001, when the Enton disaster began to
brcali. A search of mnior newoaocr
arridct (Westlaw database NPMI)
for the turms "soccid ourooec
,
s.
r
.
cntiry" or "special purpose entities" during the year 1999 yielded zero results. The first article in this
database appearcd in October 2001 and a search of2002 now yields over 328 results (as of the second
wccli in Ocrober 2002, with more being added daily).

.
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demise was a synergisric combination of human errors and hubris: a "Eta~zic'~~
miscalculation, rather than a "perfect storm.""
I. WHY TITANIC IS A BETTER METAPHOR FOR ENRON'S EVENTUAL
DOWNFALL THAN IS THE PERFECT STORM

The story of d ~ Tirnnic
e
is well-known. The ship was, at the time of its maiden (and
only) transatlantic voyage, the largest in the world, carrying a microcosm of society."
The glitterati of the United States and Europe were on board, as were hundreds of
immigrants trying to malce their way to a new land. The ship was built with watertight
compartments that extended from the Iceel up several declcs (some to D Deck and
some ro E declc); she also had a double bottom for extra protection.13She was designed
to float with any two consecutive compartments flooded and even with three of the
first five compartments (out ofsixteen) flooded,I4 thanlcs to electronic doors that could
be closed by a single c ~ m m a n d .And
' ~ she was touted as "unsinlcable," at least in some
press reports. 16
But sink she did, based upon a series of miscalculations, no single one of which
might have proved fatal, but all of which, talcen together, doomed the ship. In a chapter of his follow-up boolc to A Nkht to Re~~zc~nbe~
called The NigI~tLivesOis" Walter
Lord enumerates the many individual mistdces made that night:

"'

And, no, it wasn't d ~ Leonardo
e
DiCaprio movie (TITANIC (20th Century Fox 1997)) that first
piqued my inrereat in d ~ ship's
c
history. I'vc bcrn bsdnated by it for probably thirty or so years. Among
other things, I'm a member ofthcXtanic Historical Sociery, and I probably own virtually every bookand
movie about the ship. Ifyou're wondering if I'm a bit obsessed with the ship and its tale, yorire right. Bur
everyone needs a hobby.
" I;c ujcd the 7itnnic comparison once before. See, e.g.. M i k Tolson, TAPFall ofEr~rot~l'Cot~verric,,t
tohippbg buyWrtnrr Scnrrdnl Offerr Foddcrjr. IVde Range if Gmrrp~Seeking rr Sy,tboljr Thtir Carfie,
HOUs. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2002, at 26, nuailable nt 2002 WL 3245488. Others have also made the comparison bcnvecn Enron and thc Etatnnir. See Edward J . Cleary, Lerrorrr For L,ztuycri Fronr The Enrorl Debacle, BENCH & B . MINN.,
Apr. 2002, at 16 (foornores omitted) (quoring George F. Will, irrdignratiotr
Ourr Enros irJirrt the Begininnirrp. WASH. POST, Jan. 16. 2002) ("Given that Enron cmployee pensions
were decimated with, as one commentator noted, the employees "lacked in steerage lilre the lower orders
on the Titnrric, and given that many starc pcnsion funds wcrc among the casualties, both state and national
public officials will bc forced ra act."); Martha Neil, PamrerrntRirk, 88 A.BA. J. 44 (Aug. 2002) ("The
collapse of Enron mighr give partners at law firms rnson to ponder another epic disaster: the sinking of
the Etarric.").
I' WKrm LOID. A NIGH'S TO REMEMBER 1 (1997) [hereinafter A NIGHTTO REMEMBER].

Id. at 174-75. She did not, however, have a double hull. Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 8.
'"d. at 175.
I"

"THENIGHT L l m ON. I

note 2.

I L ~ ~
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* the calm sea, which meant that the loolcouts couldn't see any waves breaking
against the bergs;"
the numerous, apparently ignored ice warnings from ships already crossing
the Atlantic Ocean that were using the same route as the Titnlzic;"
the lack of any systematic procedure to deliver ice and weather warnings
from the Marconi telegraph room to the bridge;"'
the fact that the lookouts' binoculars bad been lost earlier in the trip;"
the failure of the Titnlzici officers to urge Captain Smith (or each other) to
take a more cautious approach to travel, based on the calm sea and rapidly
dropping temperature;"
not enough lifeboats for the number of souls aboard;"
Captain Smith's failure to hold lifeboat drills24or to do more than a perfunctory test of the ship's bralung speed and maneu~erabilir~;'~
First Wireless Operator Phillips's famous response to an ice warning from
the CalifDr1zimz (the ship that, according to some accounts, was closest to
the Tirnlzicwhen it sunlc), "Shut up, shut up . . . I am worldng Cape ace";'"
the fact that lookout Frederic Fleet spotted the berg too late to stop the ship
or otherwise to avoid the berg;"
First Officer Murdoch's decision to port around the berg rather than ramming it head-on, a counterintuitive action that might have saved the ship;"
and
the CalifDl-rzialzidecision not to come to the aid of a vessel in enough obvious distress to fire white distress rockets (apparentlyvisible to the Calz~t-rzilnzj
crew) at several interval^.^'
The list of miscalculations goes on and on.30But Walter Lord tells it best:
Given the competitive pressures of the North Atlantic run, the chances
talcen, the lad<of experience with ships of such immense size, the haphazId. at 47.
" Id. at 48-53.
'O Id. at 53.
I' Id at GO.
"Id. at 53-54.
I 3 Id. at 72-80.

'" N I G H T T O REMEMBER, rrtppm note 12, ar 42.
"THENIGHT L I V E ON, rrtprir norc 2, at 56.
'"d. at 58.
"Id. at 59-60,
"'Id. at 59.
" I d . at 134-59.
'"And so have I, at romc social gatherings, as my very indulgent husband c m attest.
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ard procedures of the wireless room, the casualness of the bridge, and the
misassessmenr ofwhat speed was safe, it's remarkable that the 7itnnicsteamed
for two hours and ten minutes through ice-infested waters without coming
to grief any sooner.
"Everything was against us?" The wonder is that she lasted as long as she
did?'
The Pet$ct S t o ~ ~ on
n , the other hand, describes a combination of meteorological
bad luclc and human miscalculation, born less of arrogance than of desperation. Granted,
Billy Tyne, captain of the Andrea Gail, made a fatal mistalce by sailing into the storm,'"
but he did "what ninety percent of us would've done-he battened down the hatches
and hung on."33 Although the signs were clear that bad weather was coming, the sheer
magnitude of the storm was far beyond the experience (or imagination) of any of the
ship captains in the large area covered by the storm, and each of them had to malce a
quick decision:
[The weather bulletin describing Hurricane Grace] reads like an inventory
ofthings fishermen don't want to hear. . . . Every boat in the swordfish fleet
receives this information. Albert Johnston, south of the Tail, decides to
head northwest into the cold water of the Labrador Current. . . .The rest of
the sword fleet stays far to the east, waiting to see what the storm does.
They couldn't make it into port in time anyway. The Contihip HoNal~d,a
hundred miles south of Billy, heads straight into the teeth of the thing. Two
hundred miles east, . . . the Liberian-registered Zarah, also heads for New
York. Ray Leonard on the sloop Saitori has decided not to head for port; he
holds to a southerly course for Bermuda. The Laurie Dawn 8 keeps plowing out to the fishing grounds and the Eis/~ilzMar21 78, 150 miles due
south of Sable Island, malces for Halifax harbor ro the northeast. Billy can
either waste several days trying to get out of the way, or he can stay oncourse For home. The fact that he has a hold full of fish, and not enough
ice, must figure into his decision.34
Billy Tyne's decision proved wrong, and the Andrea Gail lost all six hands aboard?5
Etaniclost over 1,500 souls, with only 705 saved?6 Both events were tragic. But only

'' THENIGHT LIVE5 ON, rrpm note 2, at GI.
3 2p.c~al
<~ - thanla to Boyd Henderson for reminding me, a t a luncheon, that some human ermr conrributed to the hte of the A n d m Gail.

33 J

~ N G Erz~prp,m narc 3, at 124 (quoting CaprainTommic Bartic, of the ship ANiron).

Id.

j4

35 Id. at

186.

3 % N ~ TO
~ REMEMBER,
t ~
rrrprn note 12, at 176.
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the Titanic can trace the loss of life directly to human arrogance.37When I compare
the two tragedies in light of Jeffrey Slcilling's claim that the fall of Enron was based on
factors outside of the company's control-an economic "perfect storm"-I find that
Slcilling's claim Mls flat.

11. HOW A FAILURE OF CHARACTER CAN TURN "PERFECT STORMS"
INTO TITANIC MISTAKES
I'm not going to rehash the mechanics of the various Eoron deals here. Others have
done a good job of describing the problems with the deals?' with the Board's lack of
oversight of the deals," and with the general culture of Enron that encouraged aggressive rislc-talcing and short-term profits?0 We obviously don'r know enough about the
deals or the people yet to reach any final conclusions, so my comments are going to
concentrate on one theme-character. If we are to believe that there is a single root
cause of the Enroo mess (an arguable point at best in such a complicated situation),
failure of character gets my nomination.

)'The Golden Age's love of, and faith in, science contributed to the tngedy as well, as some of the
miscalculations that Captain Smith made were based on the scientific advances in ship design.
"See, rg.,WILLLAM C. POWERS,]R., ET AL., REPORT OF hiVETIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIm COMMITTEEOFTHE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENMN COllP., 2002 WL 198018 (CORPSCAN
1980818 (ENRON)) [hereinafter Powen Report]. T h e Powers Report is also available at http://i.cnn.ncr/
cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.rep0rdp0~ers~~ep01t.pdF.
There is also a lot OF good Congressional testi,
Document Clearing House, Stren@b~rrir~gilccnr~~ztir~g
Ouer~ight:
mony on the subject. See, ~ g . Federal
Hearing Befor the Srtbronrnn. on Commerce, Trnde rind Corrn,rner P t t i ofthe Harm Comm. on Energy
a n d Conmmerce, June 26,2002, nvnilnbleat 2002 WL 1381 127 (statemenr of Bala G. Dharan, J. Howard
Creelmore Professor of Management, Rice University); Fcdenl Document Clearing House, U S , Serlntc
~

-

u

~~

~

..

Fedenl Document Clearing House, Dercpd.nting Capitnlil.Iarkm O~rtlinea t l ~ Teitinzotry
e
of Profisor
John C Coffee, f ~ ,be@re the Srcb~o~tznliftee
ON T C e c o t ~ ~ t t ~ t ~ ~ and
t i ~ ~Firranre
t i o n ~ of the Hnlue Conzmrrre
Committee, Nov. 14,2002, a u n i l n b l e n t 2 0 0 2 W L 1381127 (statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia
University).

"

See SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMlTlEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL &FAIRS, 107TH CONG.,THEROLE OF THE BOAN) OF DIECTORS IN ENRON'S COLU\PSE, July 8,2002, nuni/nblenthttp://~vw.~ccess.gpo.go~/~ong~ess/senate/s~natl07.hunl
[hereinalier
Senate Print].
See, e.g, Tam Fowler, The Pride a n d the F a l l of Eriron, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20. 2002, ar A25
[hereinafter ThePridtntrdtheFnll] ("[One manager, told that a deal would talce a year, said,] 'I haven't got
I ymr. If I can't do ir in thrcc rnonrhr I uon'r do i r br.c:iusr. my bonus dcpcods on it"' since "Ironu~r\lwcrc
b a e d on rllr iuml v:tluc of the d~.nl. nor rhc cull it brouahr in."l: GKC H ~ I L I ITI,?
. E,II~~E~I~OIIIT/,C
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Character and leadership are inextricably linked.'" When the leaders are engaging
in self-dealing and side deals,"hd the supervisors of those leaders are also engaging in
side deals,13 and the gatekeepers are approving those side deals,"" what should the rank.
and fde be thinking! Given the magnitude of the potentially illegal profits made by
" the sense of entitlement that
CFO Andrew Fastow and CEO Jeffrey ~ l i l l i n ~ ,and
Enton e n c o u ~ a ~ e dit, "must
~
have talcen significant strength of character to resist getting on that gravy train. And yet, several people did resist. Who resisted, and why?
By now, those following the Enton case lcnow that Sherron Watkins tried to alert
CEO Kenneth Lay to serious concerns chat she had about Enroni deals:
Shordy aFter Enron announced Slcilling's unexpected resignation on August
14, 2001, Watlins sent a one-page anonymous letter to Lay. The letter
stated that "Enron has been very aggressive in its accounting-most notably the Raptor transactions." The letter raised serious questions concerning
the accounting treatment and economic substance of the Raptor ttansactions (and transactions between Enton and Condor Trust, a subsidiary of
Whitewing Associates), identifying several of the matters discussed in this
Reporr. It concluded that "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in

"

Mary C. Daly, Pnnel Di~omiotion Enrorr: What 1%/~ntI\htrg?, 8 FOmHAM J. CON'. & FIN. L. 1.
S28 (2002) ("Whar the literature reaches is that h e ethical behavior ir taught from d ~ top
e down.. . . It
is management's commitment to ethical standards that sets the tone.").
"The sclf-dealing by former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow was, apparently, approved by Enron's Board
ofDirectors when the Board waived its ethics rules (more h a n once) to allow Fastow to h a d nvo oarmcrships rhntwould be negoriaringwith Enron. Sre. e.5. Letter from Max Hendrick, 111, V~nson& Elldnr, to
J a m s V Derrick. Jr., Enron [Re: Preliminary Investigation of Allegations of an Anonymous Employccl
(Oct. 15,2001), nunilnble nt 2001 WL 1764266 (CORPSCAN); rep a h Senate Print, szpra note 39, at
23-24; Powers Report, rrpm note 38, at '68-71.

"The Enron B o d apparently had several dirccrars who also had consulting agtecmcnc; with Enron,
enabling a form of double-dipping. Ser Senate Print, rrrpm note 39, at 51-55.
" See Powers Report, npm note 38, at '10 ("There was an absence orforcehl and effective oversight
by Senior Enmn Management and in-house counsel, and objcctivc and critical professional advice by
outside caunscl at Vinson & Elldns, or auditors at Andersen.").
45 Fmtotu Chnrged \nth Fmrtd, Cmrqiracy in Enrorr Cme, WASH. PO=, Oct. 3. 2002, at AOI: April
Wirr 8r Peter Bchr, Drcnmjob Etno Inn, nNighhrmre; SkiNingiS~rcreirCl~rrerrtHi~h
Price, WAZH. POST,
July 29,2002, at A01; ree aho Senate Prinr, rrpm note 39, at 24,34-36; Powers k p o r t , rrLppm note 38, at
'3, 10.
""nron
employees who mastered dlc art oftrading and dcal-maldng could earn fantastic sums.
Annual bonuses wcrc as high as $1 million. Sharrly after each bonus rime, a ncw cmp ofsilvcr
Porsches-the moer favored sntus symbol at Enron-would appear in h e company garage. "I
remember one trader going crazy because his bonus was only $500,000. He was cursing and
screaming and rhmwing things at his deslc." one former Enron employee tedls. "He thought
because he was so brilliant, rhcy should be paying him a lot marc."

Hassell, nq,m note 40, at 1.
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a wave of accounting scandals." Lay told us that he viewed the letter as
thoughtfully written and alarming."'
Wadcins later told Lay that she had written the letter and met with him regarding
her concerns!'
Lay referred the matter to Enron's General Counsel, James Derrick, a
former Vinson & EUcins partner!9 Derrick in turn aslied Vinson & Ellcins, one of
Enron's key outside law firms, to conduct a preliminary review of the situation-but
nor to review the underlying transactions that Wadcins had discussed in her letter.50
Within the confines of Derriclc's request, Vinson & Ellcins conducted an investigation
(interviewing Watlcins, among others).
V&E concluded that "none of the individuals interviewed could identify any transaction between Enron and LJM that was not reasonable from Enron's standpoint or
that was contrary to Enron's best interests." O n the accounting issues, V&E said that
both Enron and Andersen aclmowledge[d] "that the accounting treatment on the CondorlWhitewing and Rapror transactions is creative and aggressive, but no one has
" Powcrs Report, rrtppm note 38, at 79. Note the new standards of behavior imposed on company
attorneys by Sarbanes-Oxley:

Not later thnn 180 days after the dare of cnacrmcnr of this Act, the Commission shall issue
rules, in the public interest and far the prorccrion of investors, setting fordl minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and pncticing before the Commission in any way in
the represenration of issuers, including a rulc(1) requiringm attorney to repon cvidencc ofa material violation ofsecurities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counscl
or the chief executive officer of the complny (or thc equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or ogcrr does nor appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the cvidencc to the audit commincc of the board of directors of die issuer or to
another committee of the board ofdirectors comprised solely ofdirectors not employed direcdy or
indirectly by the issuer, or to the b o d ofdirectors.

Sarb:mes-Oxley Act of2002 § 307, 15 USC 9 7245 (West Supp. 2002). AFrcr a whole slew ofparties
filed objccrions to the SECS Proposed Rule regarding atrorncy conduct (with many of the objcctionr
focused on the "noisy withdrawal" provisions of the l'roposcd Rule, rce http://~vww.scc.go~/ruIeslproposed/r74502.~html), the SEC nppnrrntly abandoned the "noisy withdrawfl provision in its final
rer l~ttp://~v.sec.gav/ncws/pms/2003-13.htm.
As of d ~ i swriting, I have only seen the press relcasc
regarding h e final rule, not the actual text of the rule.The daysaftaldngan irrue only partially up the chain ofcommand arcover, at least for publicly traded
compnnies. But havcn'r lawyers always had the responsibility oFtaking m a n t a all the way up the chain of
command? See MODEL RULE OF PROF'I. CONDUCTR 1.13 (2002). I wondcr whcrher Ms. Watldns, as
an accountant, had a similar dury under her professioni ethics rules. lrshr did have such a duty, and she
didn't go all thcway to the Board ofDirrctars (and beyond) with hrrconcerns, \rosshe r d l y awhisdeblowcr?
(Mind you, whar she did took some guts, even though she was not a whistleblower in d ~ true
e sense.)

''

Powers Report, rtrpra note 38, at 79.

See Ellcn Joan Pollock, A n d m n : Called to Account: Elrrorr Lawyers Farr Cor~greisOuer Their Role,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,2002, at C13 (noting that Dcrriclr used to be a partner at Vinson Br Elkins).

'"ewers Report, rrrpm note 38, at 79.
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reason to believe that it is inappropriate From a technical standpoint." V&E concluded
that the facts revealed in its preliminary investigation did not warrant a "further widespread investigation by independent counsel or auditors," although the firm did note
that the "bad cosmetics" of the Rapror related-party transactions, coupled with d ~ e
poor performance of the assets placed in the Raptor vehicles, created 'kserious risk of
adverse publicity and 1itigation."j1
One observation: Vinson & Ellcins's undertalcing of the investigation had certain
restrictions, including Enron's request not to review the bona fides of the underlying
transa~tions.~'We
don't know what sort of give and ralce occurred between Enron and
Vinson & Ellcins about the useMness of such a request.j3 At some point, thanlcs to the
abiliry of Enron's chapter 11 management to waive the attorney-client privi~ege,~'
we
Id. at *80.
"Id. at '71). "The result of rheV&E review was largcly predcrermincd by the scopc and nature of the
investigation and the process employed. . . .The scopc and process of the investigation appear to have
bccn strucrurcd with less skepricism than was needed to see through these particularly cornplcx tmsactions." Id. at '81 (footnote omitted).
53]ordan Mina, Enran Global Finance's General Counsel, has stated that Vinson & Ellcins "fulfilled
its professional duries" in terms of the advice it gave to Enron. Laura Goldberg, Er~ror~j.
Imrd nr Releuant
nrDczrlrIReporrril.lnyH~u~
E l d P ~ r t i n Tnith~,
l
HOUS. CHRON.,Feb. 11,2002, at 1. Because ofVinson &
Elldnri ties to Enron's Gcncral Counsel Jnmm Derrick, though, M i n a hired a separate firm, Fried, F m k ,
Harris, Shriver &Jacobson, to review the deals ofwhich Wadcins had camplaincd. RoncTempest, E?~rorr
Cotrtlrrl WcnzedALorrt P~rmcr~hiyr
Robc Conpnrij~iL e p l E u e c ~ r t i e dOpinion ofLaw Fin12 61 April.
Co~~b~e~~ionnlIr~veiti~i~to~~
Sny It 1Vm to 'Hnlt Thir Pmctict,' L.A. TIM=, Jan. 31,2002, at CI. I'm nor yet
rndy to gct on thc bandwagon that denounces all of Enroris lawyers.
The principal m e involving privilege in dxe banluuprcy context is, of course, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Wcinmuh, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985) ( " M e hold that the trustee ofa corporation in [a chapter 71 banlvuptcy has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with
respcct to pre-bmkruprcy cammunications."). Wcintnub answcrcd the question of how much control a
chapter 7 trustee had aver the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Id. SSubsequent cases have annvered
the question about how h r rhc Weintraub holding could go in a chapter 11 contort. See, e.$, Am.
Mcuacornm Corp. v. Duane Morris & Heclscher LLP, 274 B.R 641, 6 5 P 5 6 (Banlrr. D. Dcla. 2002)
(snting that debtor-in-possession controls attorney-client privilege, and debtor-in-possession can request
documents from attorneys even if attorneys raise work product privilege as a defense): In re Bame, 251
B.R 367,370,374 (Bnnlir. D. Minn. 2000) (converting chaprcr 1 l case to chapter 7 case; holding thar
.
communications bctwcrn the debtor-inchapter 7 trustee can access the port-petition, prc-canvcaion
possession nnd its lawyers becauc the privilege is held by the estate, and not by the debtor-in-porse55ian):
Whythyre v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tew. 1992) ("The liquidating
trustee [undcr a confirmed chaprer I I plan] controls the power to waive or invoke the evidenriav privileges thar arise in connection with the causes afacrion transfcrtcd to the liquidating trust under h i c l e
25.5 of the confirmed plan."); rre~lroS. AirTtansp.. Inc. v. SAT Group. Inc.. 255 B.R. 706,711 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2000) (cirations omirtrd).
Thc Court agrees that a corporate fiduciary ir precluded from asserting privileges to protect his
own intercrts that are advenc to those of the corporation. Corporate officers must "exercise the
privilege in a manner consisrcnr with their tiduciary capacity to act in the best interests of the
corporation and not of themselves individually."
Id. The interesting part ahour the privilege issue in the Enron banluuprcy context is whether Steve
Cooper (the restructuring expert currently running Enron) is going to waive the privilege in order to get
5l
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may learn more. But I have to admit, right off the bat, that I have a hard time believing
that Vinson & EUcins, or any of Enron's other law firms, lrnowingly advised Enron to
do anything that was clearly illegal. The real issue is how Enron handled the grey areas
of the law, based on the advice of all of its lawyers (both its in-house and outside
counsel).
Watkins wasn't the lone voice questioning Enron's deals; others, including Enron
Global Finance's General Counsel Jordan Mina, were concerned about the structure
and disclosure of the various deals.55 Apparently, Fastow and Slcilling didn't brook
disagreement willingly. Those who objected often found themselves the subject of
pressure, downright abuse, and exile.5G
I'd like to put forward one strilcing similarity between the Titanic and Enron: a
failure of meaningful communication stemming from a belief that someone else had
'talcen care of it." Here's how a recent newspaper article described the problem:
[Slince most only saw their part of the business, they assumed the problems
were isolated. . "You understood your piece of the business and maybe
what the guy next to you did, hut very few understood the big picture. . . .

..

information from the w i o u s law firms that rcprescnted Enron and then, if the information gives risc to
a cause of action against any oFEnronls lawyers, use that very information to pursue them in bankruptcy
court. Mr. Cooper can dso pursue Enron's officers and directors using that privileged informarion, as the
privilege belongs to the client (Enmn) and not to any of the clienr's employees. I've been following the
work of the Severed Enron Employees Coalition in the pursuit of rhc prcpetition bonuses paid to certain
Enron executives on the theory that d ~ bonuses
e
were fraudulent convcyances. Severed Enron Employees
Coalition v. N.Trust CO., NO.02-0267 (S.D. Tex.complaint, tiled Jan. 24,2002). Any privileged advice,
on the order of "Should we pny this person a rctcntion bonus? What will we get in terms of a benefit far
the retention bonus?," could be I~elpCulin this regard.
l5
See, e.g., Senate Prinr, rrtprn note 39, at 28 n.81 (quoting an internd mcmorandum from Mina):

[Tlhe Company needs to improve both the process it follows in executing such tnnsactions
and implement impmved pmcedures regarding written substanriatian supporung and memorializing the EnronILJM transactions. . . . [Flirsr is the need for the Company to implcmcnr a more
active and systematic effort in pursuing "on-LJM sales alternatives before approaching LJM . . . ;
the second is t o . . . impose a more rigorous testing of the hirness and benefits realized by Enron in
transacring with LJM.
Id.; ,re elm Dan Feldstein, Skilli~rgSrys He Did No IWor~g1Lnryer Told Not to Stick Ned Otct, Hous.
CHRON., Feh. 8, 2002, at 1 (describing how Fasrow tried to bully Mina into blmsing irregularities in
certain Enron dcds).
"See, e.8, The Pride nndrht Fall, rtrprn note 40, at 27A (listing three people--hdcrsen partner Carl
Bass, former Enron CFO (after Fastow) Jeff McMahon, and former Merrill Lynch analyst John Olsonwho were dcmotcd (Olson was fired) aker criticizing the aggressive Enron deals and accounting methFeb. 15.2002, arA20; Andy Geller,
ods); reenlro Editorial Desk. Not Qtlite n iW,i~tIe-Bloruer;N.Y. TIMES,
'YB~Iieve12.f~.
Skilli~~gnndiZ.lr.
Fostolu Dr1ped12.fr.Lny'LEnrorr W R i p Drro Be,& Corzgess, N.Y. POST,
Feb. 15. 2002, at 9; Susan Schmidt. CEO IVa >fi~seruedlAtErrron, Hill Told Fanner.Ex~crrtiveBb~,zes
Other %pManngcrr,WASH. POST, Feb. 15,2002, ar AOl; Peter Spiegel, TheArchitebofE~~ro~fiDoro~rfnll:
Intenml Probe Revmlr Andy F m r u N a CFO t u h ~Bttllied Staff and EUEJ~
Wnll Sweet Banks, Errrichirrg
Hinuelfby More than Dollnrr 45nr br thf Process, FIN. T I M E S , May 21, 2002, at ,420.
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That segmentation allowed us to get worlc done very quiddy, but it isolated
that institutional knowledge into the hands ofvery few people."57
Certainly, the Powers Report describes the failure of follow-through regarding several of the Enron deals-the failure to ascertain if the checla and balances, supposedly
part of each deal's structure, were in place and worlting."As John CofFee explains,
Enron . . . hrnish[es] ample evidence of a systematic governance failure.
Although other spectacular securities frauds have been discovered from
time to time over recent decades, they have not generally disturbed the
overall market. In contrast, Enron has clearly roiled the marlcet and created
a new investor demand for transparency. Behind this disruption lies the
market's discovery that it cannot rely upon the professional gatekeepersauditors, analysts, and others-whom the marker has long trusted to filter,
verify and assess complicated financial information. Properly understood,
Enron is a demonstration of gatelceeper Failure, and the question it most
sharply poses is how this failure should be rectified."
Failures of gatekeeper professionals aren't new. The savings and loan crisis, which
also represented a significant gatekeeper failure, occurred a mere twenty years ago:"'
the Salomon Brothers Treasury bonds trading scandal occurred just ten years ago."'

j7 See, cs, The Pridt mid the FnN, rrpm note 40, at 27.4. Rcmcmbcr that those "very few people"
included members ofthe Board of Directors, which waived Enron's ethics rules mare than once to allow
self-dealing by some of Enroni cxccutivct. Secrrpm note 42.
jUSee Powers Report, rrpnr norc 38, at '18-28.
jSJohn C. Coffee, Jr. Uzdrr~tnnding
Enron: Iti Abotrt the Gntekeepe~.r,Stupid, 57 Bus. LAW. 1403
(2002) (footnote omitted), reprinted br thii book at 125-143.

"Now that I wear bifocals, twenty years just doesn't seem that long ago.

"

Daly, srtpm note 41, at S25428: Fedeml Document Clearing House, US.Senate Cornminer on
Conznzerce, Srie~rrenud Tmr~spomtionHolds a Henring on Enrorr Bnnknptr): Dec. 18, 2001, nuailable nt
2001 WL 1623334 (statement ofJohn Coffee. Columbia University) ("Well, when a dchacle like Entnn
occurs, thecritical question for Congress m d for regulators is to ask, ar;you've been beginning to a k , where
were the gatekeepers: where were the watchdogs?. . . Here, all hiled, and all hiled hirly abysmally.").
The Mlout from [rhr saving.; and loan] scandal included a Justicc Department action against
thc piesrigious New Yorli firm of Kaye, Schalcr, Fierman, Hays & Handler. I(ayc, Scholcr and
partner Peter Fishbein were raid to have gone beyond mere aggressive lnwycring, and more than
one obscrvct vicwcd their teptesentation as aldn to aiding and abetting, while others attributed any
crtots to simple inattenriveness. Ulrimatrly, the case w a srrrled, with thc firm and its malpractice
carrier pnying $41 million in settlement, and the I<eating lawyers paid for rhrir alleged sins, notwithstanding their ability to spread the loss to other lawyers via malpnctice insurance coverage.

: B~nknptryofa Birrinerr Pflrndiplfor Concrptrializing and
Jeffrey W. Srcmpcl, Et,rbracing D t r c ~ t The
RegztLztirrg the Lepl Prof.r~io,z.27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 111-12 (1991)) (footnatcs omitted). For a

It's certainly possible that many of the legal and accounting professionals (the inhouse and the outside professionals) who advised Enron assumed thar Enron's own
businesspeople were doing the follow-through; moreover, many of those same professionals may well have thought that it was not the lawyers' or accountants' "place" to
bill Enron for continued checlts of the system. (I lrnow nothing about the training of
accountants, so I'm going to limit the rest of this discussion to the training nflawyers.)
If the lawyers saw themselves as morally independent from Enron, rather than morally
interdependent, then they might well have believed that it was Enron's job, not theirs,
to ensure follow-through. A more complex explanation is thar cognitive dissonancewell-documented in social science literature and applied to lawyers by, among others,
David Luban-prevented the lawyers from seeing some of these deals more clearly. My
hunch is that both concepts (a mistalcen belief in moral independence, rather than
interdependence, and the effects of cognitive dissonance) played a part in any failures
by the gatelceepers.
A. "Moral Independence" Versus "Moral Interdependence" as an
Explanation

For the longest time, lawyers have done everything they could to distinguish the
client's ends from the means that the lawyers used to achieve those ends. This "moral
independence" theory has been used to justify eve+ng
from lawyers who talce on
unpopular causes to lawyers who facilitate shady deals, even though the original theory
was never intended to justify shady deals!"

wonderful discussion of the IGye, Scholer firm and the savings and loan crisis, see David B. Wilkins,
M,~kingContnrCormt:&gr/atir~gLazyerrAfterhy~,
Srholer, 66 S. CAL. L. FGV. 1147 (1993).As Clarence
Darrow apparendy said, "History repeats itself, and rhais one of the things thar's wrong with history."
The Quotations Home Page, available nt hnp:llwww.geociues.cam/-spanoudi/ropic-l~3.html#history.
I'

According to a study by Envin Smigel, lawyers'

independence derived fmm nuo sources. First, "they. . . 'represeni the law and must therefore
separate rhemselves from the clienr." Second, the commodiry they sold was "[ilndependent legnl
opinion." Smigel observedthat "clienr[s] desire thar afirm maintain itsautonomy" so that rhey can
obtain the best advice. Moreover, a the Ixge firms grew older, they increased their number of
clients and moved away fmm fundamentally relying on one or a few clienc~.This rhik "strengthened . . . a firm's abiliry to retain its independence" because "no one client provid[es] enough
income to materially or cansciously influence d ~ law
e office's legal opinion."
Russell G. Pearce, Lnruyrrr m Anrericai Govtmirzg Clnrr: The Fornmtion and Dimlrrtion of the Ort@rmI
Uxdcr~tandi~zg
of the Anrertcan Latoyeri Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCt1. ROUNDTABLE 381. 406 (2001) (footnot- omitted) [hcreindrer Governing Class] (quoting ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THEWALL S T U U LAWYER:
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964)).
The fun part about the history of the bat's independence theory is its link with the robber barons of
yesteryear. See, e.5, Thomas L. Shaffer, ThcRof~riorimahJoralZacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.]. 195,222-23
(1986) [hereinafter Moral Teacher];Thomas L. Shaffer, The Lhiqrie, Noucl, rind U ~ ~ o r ~ ~ ~ d A d u e r ~ ~ ~ E r b i c ,
41 VAND.L. REV. 697,703-04 (1988). As Russell Pearce points our,
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Several scholars have recognized, though, that the complexity of modern legal practice forces lawyers to tale a more active role in shaping not just the clients' advice but
the clients' deals and litigation as well.@ Richard Painteis "moral interdependence"
theory of the lawyer-client interaction is a more realistic view of the lawyer's modern
role, especially when it comes to complex transactions or complex litigation.64
When you overlay the lawyer's moral interdependence on top of a cutthroat culture,
you get Enron (and WorldCom, and Tyco, etc.). We still don't know a lot of the facts
behind Enron's various deals, including what the various lawyers said, Enron's response
to that advice, or how much the accountants' advice contradicted (or suppotted) the
lawyers' advice. Bur we do know that the structure of Enron itself encouraged a constant pushing of the outside of the envelope." Enron encouraged a "me, first" structure, not a cooperative one.
"Enron sought to redefine the rules of the industry," said Robett Bruner, a
professor at the University ofVirginia who has made a case study ofEnron's
culture. "It was a culture of challenge and confrontation."

....

[Former CEO Jeffrey] Skilling also is responsible, many insiders say, for
creating a mercenary, cutthroat culture to stoke the fires beneath the enterprise. One of the hallmarks of the Skilling regime was a performance review process that employees called "rank and yank." The evaluations
compared the performance of employees against one another, with the bottom 15 percent getting axed every year.

In becoming hired guns, elite lawyers abandoned the traditional governing dass ideology. They
were no longer acting as a disinterested political leadenhip capable ofdiscerning and pursuing d ~ e
common good. Instead, they were advocates ofprivate interests. They hadvialatcd pmfessionalism's
taboo on actingas a servant ofbig business and could no longer claim the special rie ro the public
good which distinguishcd them from those in business.
Pearce, Gowenrin~C l m , sripra, ar 400-10.

"

Richard W. Painter, TheMornlInrerdepmdencc of C o p o r n t e L n ~ u y e r r a ~Their
~ d Clieritr, 67 S. CAL.L.
REV. 507,5 11,544-45 (1994); reenho id. at 526 ("Joint decisionmaking by lawyer and clicnr has become
both efficient and prudent.") (footnore omitted).

''

For example, the Powers Reporr points out that, wid, respect to preparing the various dirclorure
forms that Enran filed, "[wlhile accountants toolc the lead in .
preparing
. the financial statement footnote
disclosures, lawyers played a more ccnual role in preparing the pmxy statements, including the disclosures
of the related-parry transactions." Powers Report, rriprn note 38, at 84. This interdependence is by no
means 1imirL.d to rhc lauycrr who workutl a n Enron'r dcala. Scr Go,rnti,,~:Cllur, ~,,,ur.inore 6 2 , at 408-09
lcirina
Rubrrr A. Kawn
ofLnxv
I.z,t Firu,r h~nrrirr.
. 37
.
, 2nd Rubrr<Eli Rosrn. On the SurialS~~miiicn,rrc
-,
,
STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985) and Robert L. Nelson, Ideolog, Practice, nrrd P m $ ~ ~ i o l r n ~ A f l t l ) n o Social
~~y:
I/olrresn~rdClientRrl?rio,rrl,iprtiip i n rhcLnrgeLnruFinn, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985)). Borh the IGgnn Br
Roren study and the Nelson study are well worth reading.
~

~

-

~

"I first saw this phrase in TOMWOLFE,
THENGHT STUFF12 (1979).
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The evaluations were done by asldng employees to judge others' performance. They did so lrnowing their own promotions and survival hung in
the balance.
"Because of that, you never helped one another," said one former Enron
employee. "Everyone was in it for themselves. People stabbed you in the
back."
Teamwork, once a source of strength, started to disappear.
n
said.
"It was every man for himself," a former E ~ o executive
What sense of teamworlc survived "rank and yank" was undermined by
Enron's reward system, which seemed to place no value on group goals but
lavishly rewarded individual accomplishment. An employee who could dose
big deals got big bonuses and promotions. Those who couldn't were shown
the door.66
Let's take this moral interdependence theory one step further. Add to the theory (1)
Enron's culture, and (2) the personality traits of a large number of lawyers (whether or
not they ever had Enron as a client), and you have a disaster just waiting to happen.
Susan Daicoff has summarized the literature on lawyers' personaliy traits quite nicely
in a series of articles.67 Lawyers tend to have certain personaliy characteristiu; that
contribute to their need to "win." They "appear to be more competitive, aggressive,
and achievement-oriented, and overwhelminglyThidcers (instead of Feelers). . . .Lawyers are more often motivated by a need for achievement than are others, which includes a need to compete against an internal or external standard of intelligence."68No
matter which way you slice it, these gatekeepers were too closely involved with their
client6' to be able to stand up and say, "You shouldn't do that." At some point, we need
lawyers to say, "The law lets you do it, but don't. . . . It's a rotten thing to do."7U

"

Hascll, rrlpm note 40. For a masterful compendium ofthe theories surrounding communiry norms
in monitoring and shaping the roles of lawyers, see W Bradley Wendel, NnnlcplRe~tlntioaof the L e p l
Pmjssio,r SocialNonnr 6 , Proj~rionnlCommaaitics, 54 VAND.L. REV. 1955 (2001) [hrreinafrer Social
Nornri].
"See, c s , Susan Daicoff,L n l y e ~Krtoru ThyszPA Reuieru ofE~~rpirirnlRe~cnrc!,
071AttorneyAmibrrter
Benrinx on P r o j ~ ~ i o ~ m 46
l i ~AM.
~ n , U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) [hereinafter Know Thyre@; Susan Daicoff,
(O~ynror.on?)EthicalDeci~io~~~~~nki~~gbyAho~~~qi:A~~
EnpiricalShtdy, 48 FLA L. REV. 197,217-18 (1996).
6%~zntow Thyseg sup" note 67, at 1408-09 (footnotes omitted). According to Daicoff, law rcudenct
come into law school hard-wired with these mi=. Id. at 1349-50. Imagine my reliefar luawing that law
school didn't "ruin" them.
" Sec, r . ~rrpm
, notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
7" So1 M. Linowie, 1CInserrt ofTnltl,for the Lr~lProf.s~iors
Address ar the University of Wisconsin
LawSchool (Ocr. 24,1997). in 1997Wls. L. REV. 1211,1214-15 ("I believeElihu Root onceagain had
it exactly right when he cold a client: "The law ler[s] you do it, bur don't. . . . It's a rotten thing to do.").
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B. Cognitive Dissonance as an Explanation
Even if the gatelceepers weren't so closely involved with the client, there's yet another
reason for their failure to protest the deals thar were on (or over) the edge: cognitive
dissonance. My sociologist friends7' tell me that moral development alone-which is
an individual trait-can't explain how an individual will react to a particular situati~n!~The situation itselfwill interact with the traits ofthe individual, and both the
person's individual traits and his situation will affect an 0utcome.7~
Peer pressure is one such particular influence. There are some well-regarded studies
showing that even relatively obvious physical conclusions, such as the distance from
one point to another or the length of a line, can become subject to "groupthink,"
placing peer pressure on the unbelieving minoriv to conform to the wrong-headed
rhinlcing of the majority.74And if hard-wired concepts, such as size and location, are
manipulable by the particulars of the situation, what about the fuzzier concept of
behavior?
Stanley Milgram's studies on the willingness of experimental subjects to inflict pain
(electrical shoclts) on complete strangers can give us a glimpse into how powerful the
effect of a particular situation can be. In Milgram's best-lcnown study, the actual suhject was asked to give a series of progressively more severe shoclts to someone who was
posing as a fellow experimental subject. Although the actual subject usually agonized
about administering the shoclu, he went ahead and administered them nonethele~s.7~
In analyzing Milgram's experiment, Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett concluded that
the powerful structure ofthe situation-the authority figure setup; the calm tones of

"

Special thanlu go to Julia McQuillan, who guided mc through the litenrurr and theories in her

ficld.

''

CJ Julia IvlcQuillan &Julie Pfeiffer, IVhy Annchlnkei ra Dizzy: RendiqAnue ofGmcn Gnblerfronz
n Gender Periyectiue, 16 MOSAIC 3412, June 2001, at 19 ("In an attempt to crplain variation within scr
carcgaries, sociologisu have ;argued that external social structures (our actual experiences in the world)
organize our behnvior more than socialization (how we've bcen told to behave).").
73 Thc thought that moral dcv~lopmcntalonc can predict a pcaon's bchavior without regard to the
OF
particular siruadon is called the "fundamental attribution error." See DAVID J. LuBAN, THEETHICS
WRONGFUL
OBEDIENCE, irr ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLB, ~ P O N S I B I L I T I B AND
,
REGULATION 94, 101 (Debonh L. Rhode cd., 2000) [hereinokcr WRONGFUL OBEDIENCE];
ree n60 Lee M .
Johnron, et al., Gerreral Wrnu Specific WVict Blanzir~fi142 J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 249 (Apr. 2002) ("The
fundamenral attribution error occurs when individuals overemphasize personal artribures and discount
environmental attributes in their judgmenti ofothers"); LEEROSS,THE INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST
AND
HIS SHORTCOMINGS: DISTORTIONS IN THE AWNBUTION PROCESS, IN 10 ADVANCES IN EXPENMENTAL SOClAL PSYCI-I. 173 (Leonard Bcrl<owiard., 1977); refgenem//yDAVID C. FUNDER, PERSONALITY
JUDGMENR A RWLISL'IC APPROACH TO PERSONAL PERCEI'TION (1999).

''

LEE ROSS 81 RICHAN) E. NISBE'IT, THE PERSON AND THE SrlUATIONS: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 30 (1991) ("Our most basic perceptions and judgmenti about thc world are socially conditioned and dicrarcd.") (citing ShcriFs "autoliinctic cffeci' studies and Aschs "comparison lines" studies).
75 Id.

at 56-57.

the experimenter standing next to the subject who was administrating the shocks; the
experimenter's repetition of the phrases, "The experiment requires that you continue;
you have no choice"-sewed to overcome the subjects' expressed desire to stop the
experiment before reaching the "severe shock" stage?6 ~ n s oft the subjects were stymied by uncertainty and couldn't overcome the social pressure of the situation. It's not
that the subjects were sadists. But the structure of the situation prevented them from
acting on their own reluctance to continue the shocla.
David Luban has also described the Milgram experiment and has pointed out that
almost two-thirds of the subjects in Milgram's experiments actually did go all the way
to 450 volts?7 H e posits that a "corruption of judgment" stemming from cognitive
dissonance caused two-thirds of the subjects of Milgram's experiments to "lcill" the
learner:
[Tlhe lcey to understanding Milgram compliance lies in features of the
experimental situation. . . .The teacher moves up the scale of shocla by 15volt increments, and reaches the 450-volt level only at the thirtieth shock.
Among other things, this means that the subjects never confront the question "Should I administer a 330-volt shoclc to the learner?"The question is
"Should I administer a 330-volt shock to the learner given that I've just
administered a 315-volt shock?" It seems clear that the latter question is
much harder to answer. . . .
Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that when our actions conflict with
our self-concept, our beliefs and attitudes change until the conflict is removed. . . . Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that when I have given
the learner a series of electrical shocla, I simply won't view giving the next
shock as a wrongful act, because I won't admit to myself that the previous
shocla were wrong.78
Luban's most important point is that lawyers aren't immune to the effects of cognitive dissonance. He does a masterful job of linlcing the Berkey Pl~oto-Inc.v. Emn72
Ihdak Co." case and Stanley Milgram's experiments on obedience to explain how very
well-intentioned lawyers can find themselves slipping into serious breaches of ethics.
For those who aren't familiar with this case, Brad Wendel describes it nicely:
"
'me
ofMilgram's larer variations on the scudy involved changing rhc setting from Yale to an innercity, run-down, suspicious-looking lab in another town. He recorded appraximarely the same results, no
matter the sctring. See id. ar 55.

WRONGFUL
OBEDIENCE,
srpm note 73, at 97 ("In reality, 63 percent of subjects complied all the
way to 450 volts. Mareovct, this is a robust result: ir holds in groups of women a well as men, and

experimenters obtained comparable results in Holland, Spain. Iraly, Ausmlia, South Africa. Germany,
and Jordan.. . .") (footnore omirted).

" I d . ar 102 (foornorct omitted).
" 74

F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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The lawyers representing Ibdak had retained an economist as an expert
witness, expecting that he would testify that Kodak's domination of the
market was due to its superior technological innovations, not to
anticompetitive behavior. The plaintiffs counsel requested any documents
pertinent to the expert's testimony Kodak's lawyer's resisted, and ultimately
a magistrate ordered production of numerous documents including interim
reports prepared by the economist. At the economist's deposition, one of
Kodak's lawyers stated that he had destroyed the interim reports, which
were somewhat unfavorable to Kodalt's defense. The lawyer even filed an
affidavit in a subsequent discovery dispute in the case, stating under oath
that the documents had been destroyed. In fact, the lawyer bad not destroyed the documents, but had hidden them in his office and widheld
them from production. The 81davit was perjurous. The fallout was a calamity for the firm. Ibdalc fired it and hired one of its arch-rivals to defend
the antitrust case. The firm paid its client over $600,000 to settle Kodalis
claims related to its conduct of the litigation. It lost Kodalis business, which
had accounted for approximately one-fourth of the firm's billings and had
employed thirty lawyers full-time. The partner who had coordinated the
firm's preparation of the economist's testimony was released from the firm
and spent twenty-seven days in jail for contempt of court?'

In his discussion of the Berkgr-Kodakcase, Luban relates the following episode:
Joseph Fortenberry, the associate worlcing for [Mahlon Perlcins, the partner
representing Kodak], knew that Perlcins was perjuring himself and whispered a warning to him; but when Perkins ignored the warning, Fortenberry
did nothing further to correct his misstatements. "What happened" recalls
another associate, 'bas that he saw Perlcins lie and really couldn't believe it.
And he just had no idea what to do. I mean, he . . . kept thinlung there
must be a reason. Besides, what do you do? The guy was his boss and a
great guy!"B1
Fortenberty's comments highlight how fledgling lawyers will talce many social cues
from those more experienced lawyers whom they respect?' Of course, the pressure
"O Bradley Wlendrl, Momlig~Moti~~ntion,
and tht Proji~ionalLmMovenlmt, 52 S.C. L. REV. 557,
6 0 6 0 7 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see a h Walter Kiechell 111, The S m n ~ cC,uc of Kodaki. Lawym~,
FORTLINE. May 8, 1978, at 188. If1 were a supentitiaus son, I'd worry ahour the hct that one of the two
"smoking guns" in the case was Evhihit 6 6 6 Id. I I amtot maldng this up.

'' WRONGFUL
OBEDIENCE rrpm note 73, at 95 (footnotes omitted)
Cognitive dissonance isn't limited to auwide counsel. In a study of inside caunsel, Hugh and Sally
Gunz found that the lawycn' advice w a nor always independent from the direction that the company
itself intended to go:
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that the senior lawyers have to lceep their clients, maintain their billings, and compete
with other elire lawyers at other firms (who are all too happy to steal clients away), is
relentless pressure indeed. But if the more senior lawyers can't withstand the pressure,
then who will teach the fledgling lawyers to resist?
111. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Ifwe want lawyers to spend more time understanding themselves and their relationship to their clients, then we're going to have to lead from the top, with judges, partners, bar associations, and other senior lawyers all singing the same tune. It won't be
sufticient for law professors to warn students against the temptations and pressures of
law practice. As a matter of fact, it's depressing how little influence law professors have
on their students' understanding of legal ethics.
Larry Hellman's study on cognitive dissonance in a legal ethics class is proof of the
need to have top lawyers do the preaching, not law professors.s3 Hellman aslced the
students in his ethics course to lceep diaries of possible ethics violations that they observed while worlcing for lawyers during the semester, and those students recounted
bad lawyering in an astonishing variety of forms-neglect, incompetence, conflicts of
interest, and the liil~e.~"fwe want to train newly minted lawyers to be ethical, it's just
not enough for law professors to talk the talk. We must join forces with the lawyers
and judges in the "real world," those who can wallc the wallc.
Lawyers need to behave as true counselors to their clients, rather than as hired guns
who are just following orders. Society needs us to talce on the role of the social con-

From a practitioner standpoint, the model highlights issues surrounding the naNre of the advice that organizations can expect to ohnin from their in-house counsel when placed in positions
of ethical conflict. In our original study of OPC [organiutianal profasiond conflict], we sugp t e d that an important implicadon ofour findings was that in-house counscl might not necesrarily always provide disinterested professional advice. In their different ways, the Technician and
superficially helpful advice, which could, under certain cirOrganization Person might
cumstances, bc dangerously misleading. The Technician, for example, may deliver clever but myopic solutions, and rhc Observer could well misjudge a situation and rcmain silent inappropriately.
But the Advisor, by avoiding the "cop" aspect of d ~ cLawyer role (in the sense that there is no
implication that he or she intends to repart the situation to the next level higher within the organization, or to a regulator outside the orpniwuon), stays closcr ro thc L~wyerhadvice. So the
model, as revised, suggests an cvcn grcarrrvaricry ofpotential responses than in its initial L[awyer],
T[echnician], and O[bserver] form, underlining yet more firmly the need to avoid maldng simplisric assumptions about the nature ofthe advice in-house counsel provide their employcr[sl.
Hugh I? Gunz & Sally I? Gunr, Th~Lnwyer>Respometo OTnniu?tio~mlProj~~io~~al
Conflict:An Enrpiricnl
SntrlyoftheEthicnlDeririo~rMnkit~~of61-Horrre
Coerriel, 39AM. BUS. L.J. 241,279-80 (2002) (footnotes
omitted).
") Lawrence IC Hellman, ThtEff<ctr ofLnru Oficc l%rk on theFornmtion ofLtzru Shrdmu'Prof.~~in,~nl
klner: Ob~eruntion,Erplntmtior~,Opthziultion. 4 GEO.J.LEGALETHICS537 (1991).
84

Id. at 601-05.
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science (or, if that sounds too darn highfallutin', the role of the grease that helps society run). As David Luban has pointed out,
If lawyers have special responsibilities to legal justice, that is not because
they are divinely elected, or better and holier that [sic] the rest of us. It is
because of how their role fits into an entire division of social labor. Lawyers
represent private parties before public institutions, or advise private parties
about the requirements of public norms, or reduce private transactions to a
publicly-prescribed form, or ratify that transactions are in compliance with
public norms. To say that they have special duties of fidelity to those norms
is no more ecstatic and supernatural than saying that food-preparers have
heightened duties to ensure their hands are clean. It is their social role, not
the brush of angels' wings on their foreheads, that requires [food service
workers] to wash their hands every time they go to the bathr0om.8~
We used to be better at setting good examples, or so I've heard. In the "golden days"
that Tom Shaffer recounts, some of the lawyers that he observed set wonderful examples for their newly minted lawyer colleagues. In my favorite article of his, T h e
Pro$ssion N a Moral Tenchei; he tells story after story of lawyers who did the right
thing." The constant choice of ethical over unethical behavior helped mold the lawyer
that Shaffer eventually became:
[Those two partners in my former law firm] were philosophically and temperamentally different and . . . practiced law in different ways. That they
were so much &ice in these moral matters said something about their personal character, of course, but, in view of their personal differences, it also
said something about the way the firm practiced law-about the way the
firm functioned as the profession (for me) and, as the profession, Functioned (for me) as a moral teacher. It was not, that is, an apprenticeship, in
which I was learning my craft, and the morals of my craft, from a masteror at least it didn't seem, then, that it was. It was the profession (the law
firm) that was the moral teacher. . . .It was even more like the moral formation a person gets from family, town, and church. Which is to say that,
here, code depended on chara~ter.~'

" David Luban, Arkirrgthe

Right Qt~r~tiorlr,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 849-50 (1999).

86MoralEncber, rrqm note 62, at 214-17.
" Id. ar 21617.
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From his experience as a young lawyer, Shaffer took the moral lesson that a lawyer
should also be a genJeman.BBTomShafferi view of the "gentlemanly" lawyer, ofcourse,
has its
including Shafier himself.g0And yet, we do understand the concept
that he's trying to express:" that of a lawyer who understands her role in sociev as
more than just a mete scrivener or functionary, and who tries always to take the moral
high ground.g'

"Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being n Pra$ssionnl Elder, 6 2 NOTW DAMEL. REV. 624,630-31 (1987)
("When chamcrer is in lace, fortified by 'a few rules' that have ro do wid1
[hereinafter Pmf~sior~nlElder]
orofcssional craft.. the orefessional Denon becomo dependable. Professional characrer ir the connection
bcrwccn virtue and craft. The convention has bccn ra describe that connection with the word gentleman.") (footnorcs omirred). Ifyou haven't m d Tom Shaffer's work on this topic, you should. For a quick
shc,rrcl~t-n<,r tu bc c o n i s c d wirh re~diogShoITcr'a worl;-Leslie Gerher h>r ir~.nrcda good primer. See
Leslie t. Gerb;r, G ' h [.,,rgrn & S,ft,td? 'l'l~eTl,ro/oz~i.~/
Lrs.rl Er/,r/,rrrnfT/,om.u .S/~.~ff~r,
10 J.I.. & KLLIGlON 347 (1994).
"See, e.g., Ann Barrow, SrillNotBelmuir~~Like
Gerrtlmen, 49 U . ICAN. L. REV. 809, 810-1 1 (2001);
r
Their Spots: S/JottIdLatuJ~~n
Chnge?A Critiqor OfSoltctiom to
Susan Daicoff, h k i ~ ~ g ~ t o p ator dCIIRngt
Problermr ruith Prof~sionnlinnby Ref.rer~ceto Er,~piricnlb-DeriuedAttonzey
PenonalipArtribotrr, 11 GEO. J .
LEGALETHICS 547, 582-83 (1998); William J. W e r n Don R o f ~ ~ i o n n l iLiternhlre
m~
Idealize the Pmt
and Over-Rntt Civilip?lrZenl~Vice or a Cardi)rnlVirnte?,13 PROF. LAW. 1 (2001) (disputing rhe claim
that "back then"--whensver "then" waclawyers were more professional and more civil).

.

'"Thomas L. ShafFer, T h Gcnrlcn~anh Prof~sio~~nlEtl,ics,
10 QUEEN'S
L.J. 1, 11 (1984).
The 19th century gentleman in Norrli America gave us slavcry, Manifest Destiny, the theft of
half of Morico, the subjugation of women, the exploitation of immigrant children, Pinkerron
detectives, yellow-dog conmcu, and the implacable genocide of American Indians. You could
malw a case.. .that rhe gendcman's ethic is not worth raldng seriously. If the gentleman has left the
professions, the best ching for us would be ro bar the door lest hc get back in.

Id.; rre "Lo Thomar, L. Shaffct, Inatrgnml Ho,uardLicI~rnureinLechlre in Lqal Etbiu: Liyer Profitionnlinn
maMornlArg-rtntet~t,26 GONZ. L. REV. 393,400 (1991); Profirior~alEldrsrpm note 88, at 633-34.
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., In Prabe of n Genrlc Snrrl, Re>rtnrki at the Anrtrrrzl Banqrter of the
Jonr~mlofLarunt~dReli~o~on
(Ocr. 14, 1993). br 10 J.L. Sr RELIGION 279,284 (199311994).
The acid test of [Tam Shntfcis] reliance an the ethim ofgentlemen is whether it, too, is not
flawed at its core. Is it not by definition limited to males, and does it have any space for minorities?
Only one like ShaFer, who by decades ofliving like n gendcman himreifand reflecting carefully on
that ethic, could have come to the conclusion rhat the ethic of the gentleman-lawyer has greater
for the subversion of patriarchy than the ABRs mmodcl of professionalism.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
'"il
Hodes poinu out rhat "[tlhe acid test of ethical lawyering is nrely what to do in the Face of
crisir--a clienr shows you the buried bodies or drops a bloody knife on your desk or commiu perjury or
desrroys or hidu marcrid property sked for in discovery." W. William Uodes, Accepting nnd Rrjcctii,ig
Clieatr--Tl,e Morn1 Arltonorrry of rl~eSecond-to-r/>~LNt
Lawyer in Toron, 48 U . KAN...3 REV.977, 978
(2000) (citing the classic mes of Peoplc v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (buried
bodies), Srarev. Olwell, 394 E2d 681 (Wsh. 1964) (bloody imife), Nrv. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)
(perjury), and Bcrlcey P h ~ h olo,. v. Eastman KodakCo., 74 ERD. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (worlipmduct)).
For a wonderful discusion of how social norms affect lawyering, see SocinlNoni~r,srrpra nore 66.

"
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What happens when we don't set the right example? We can call doing the right
thing "behaving like gentlemen," or we can use some other, less "loaded" phrase. If we
don't exert some leadership and emphasize the role of character in the practice of law,
some very smart lawyers will continue to do stupid things, and some clients will continue to do stupid (or venal) things. Some of these people will even trot our the hoary
(and discredited) old saw that they were "just following orders."93
So how do we encourage lawyers to withstand peer pressure and client pressure,
especially in those grey areas in which the lawyer gives advice alcin to "it's an aggressive
interpretation of the law" and the client chooses to use that aggressive interpretation,
even at the risk of later litigation? Remember, we're not tallcing about lawyers who
deliberately counsel clients to flout the law. Rather, we're tallcing about lawyers who
say that a particular interpretation could go either in favor of the client or against it.
Personally, I like Russ Pearce's idea that we create a new Model Rule 1.0. His Model
Rule 1.0 would provide that "lawyers are morally accountable for their conduct as
lawyers."9"hat rule hits the question of moral interdependence head on, and it provides a powerful reminder chat "just following orders" is the wedcesr of excuses.95
We can blame part of Enron's downfall on the economy. We can blame part of it on
corporate misbehavior, on board malfeasance, and on pure greed. We can blame part
ofit on a structure that allowed gatekeepers and reputational intermediaries-the hoard,
the accountants, and the lawyers-to rely on the other nvo categories ro understand
the overall picture ofwhat Enron was doing. We can even blame the Enron employees
who chose to place too much Enron stock in their own 401(1c) plans, thereby betting
twice with the same moneY9%ut one thing we can't blame is fate. Emon's collapse
"See, e.g., Tom Fowler, h - A ~ ~ d e r s nt~di~or~lPJndrdlAide:
en
BOIJir1m toldtor/,rrdfiler. How. CHRON.,
Mar. 7,2002, ar 1 ("An assistant to the Arthur Andenen lead pmnerwho handled theEnran accountsaid
she believes her boss was just following orders when he told workers to desrrny Enron-related documents
last fall."): Marcy Gordon. SEC, I~$n,ml I%// Sweet Syrtenz Failed to Detect E~rrorrFnilrrre, Report Fink,
AssoclATED P W s NWSWRES, Oct. 7,2002. Westlaw, Allnewsplus Library (Fascow's lawyer contends
that his client was just following orders).
" ~usscllG. Pcarcc, A.IodelRzt/e 1.0: Latuyerr are lLlora/4Accorrrrmble, 70 FOMHAM L. REV. 1805,
1807-08 (2002). Pearce points out that Model Rule 1.0 would not raltc sides in current dispures regarding the lawyer's role. What ir would do is move the debates regarding the lawyeis monl duties, like that
between Freedman, who hvors z d o u representation, and Luban, Rllode, and Simon, who Favor some
significant limits on that representation, to the center of the bar's legal ethia conversarions. While the bar
currently pays some slight attention to these issues, Model Rule 1.0 would move them to a more prominent plsce in the baiz official deliberations and continuing lcgal cducation courses, as well as in the cffons
of the conscientious lawyer to explore her own moral accounrabiliry.
" I'm not sure how one might enforce a Model Rule 1.0, bur at l a s t Pearce is heading in rhe right
direction.
'"ee, t,p., Mark Davis, The Fflloat o f Fallrir
~
Etzron; Too Much Conpnny Stock in ./lll(k); P l n ~Poses
~s
R i d , 1Cw. CT
I
STAR. Jan. 20,2002, at Al; Ibja Whitehouse, 4011k) iYher!llIigbtBe Your 0 1 ~ 1 2Farrlt,
Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 18,2002, Westlaw, Allnewsplus Library. Of course, the freeze on selling
stoclc as thevaluc of the sroclispiraled downward also had something to do with the losses in the cmployees' 401 (13 plans. See, cg., Davis, rnpm; Edirorinl. Enroa nndFroinntier Jrutice Fear o f A t i m Workerr Sends
El~ergyTrndirrsFirnt m Nrru York to Filefor Bankntprcy, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dcc. 4, 2001, at DOG.

wasn't due to a "perfect storm" of mere coincidence-the collapse was caused by humans and their hubris. We need to ensure that hubris doesn't blind us to the first rule
of leadership: It's all about character.

